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In Thailand and the Philippines cyber bullies targeting internationally sup-
ported civil society groups contribute to the global trend of shrinking civic 
space by manipulating social media content to mobilise public disap proval 
of dissent. One effective tactic is to label internationally endorsed civic 
groups as Western agents and thereby traitors. 
 • Thailand’s incumbent military regime has systematically devised methods to 
suppress dissent, while the Philippines’ illiberally inclined government has di-
minished civic space. Social media is a crucial tool for both governments to 
quell critics. 
 • “Cyber troops” are organised by the Thai state and even private traditionalist 
citizens. In the Philippines, “keyboard armies” tend to be President Duterte’s 
supporters and are in some cases allegedly paid. 
 • These actors promulgate pro-government messages, surveil and report civic 
defiance to the authorities, bully and threaten critics online, and orchestrate 
offline harassment campaigns. 
 • Cyber troops effectively use “patriotic trolling” to highlight the international fund-
ing of civil society groups, which they claim is proof of their serving the interests 
of the “West” and their treason. The nationalist undertone often sparks national 
outrage, justifying the government to curb advocacy for democracy and rights. 
 • Cyber bullying is a symptom of increasingly polarised societies and should be 
situated in a broader political context. The Thai and Philippine governments ma-
nipulate cyber space to consolidate their power while exacerbating social divide. 
Policy Implications
To tackle the global trend of shrinking civic space, European policymakers, aid 
agencies, and political foundations must take two measures. First, to combat at-
tempts to label civil society as an exogenous threat to national integrity, efforts 
should be made to vernacularise policy discourses on democracy and human 
rights so as to generate local legitimacy of civil society. Second, because cyber 
bullying is also carried out by ordinary citizens against those deemed adversar-
ies, international organisations should play a discrete role in facilitating local 
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Cyber Trolling and “Shrinking Civic Space”
While cyber advocacy for democracy and human rights has grown in recent years, 
many authoritarian governments have responded by suppressing Internet freedom. 
This trend has contributed to what is currently described as “closing” or “shrinking” 
civic space (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; CIVICUS 2017). More recently, 
however, new forms of cyber manipulation have increasingly been applied along-
side more well-known forms of cyber repression. Cyber troops have started to dis-
seminate official discourses on social media and to distort and neutralise conten-
tious issues by sharing comments designed to divert public attention. In contrast, 
cyber trolls verbally abuse and harass social media users who openly disagree with 
the government, which has prompted offline assaults of critics. Online and offline 
threats can generate “chilling effects” and self-censorship that stifle checks and 
balances (Bradshaw and Howard 2017). Cyber troops and trolls can be humans or 
“bots” (i.e. fake social media accounts made of bits of code and designed to inter-
act with and mimic human users). Although cyber activism does enjoy government 
support, cyber trolling is also a citizen initiative carried out by authentic, decentral-
ized critics. It thus renders the domestic and international backlash against repres-
sive policies less effective. 
In Thailand and the Philippines “patriotic trolling” has been used to portray 
government critics – who may receive international funding or endorse agendas 
perceived as Western and liberal – as “traitors” and thereby undermined their le-
gitimacy. In Thailand patriotic trolling emerged during the red–yellow shirt conflict 
and was later used by the incumbent junta to monitor dissidents. In the Philippines 
the Duterte’s Die Hard Supporters group has also used social media sites to harass 
government critics. The individual political contexts of these two countries shape 
the intensity of cyber trolling. Thailand is an authoritarian setting where dissent 
is criminalised and Internet surveillance is entrenched, whereas the Philippines 
remains an electoral democracy; though, Duterte’s strongman rhetoric reflects an 
illiberal shift from the post-1986 political order in the latter. Therefore, cyber bul-
lying in these countries is not merely a matter of violated freedom of expression but 
rather a vehicle for expressing clashing political visions and deeper crises. Counter-
ing cyber trolling requires that domestic and international actors engage in “cyber 
dialogue” across the aisle. 
This contribution examines the nexus of cyber bullying and shrinking civic 
space. First, it outlines the characteristics of the political regimes in Thailand and 
the Philippines and analyses how they shape cyber manipulation. Second, it eluci-
dates the composition of cyber troops and their tactics in these countries. Third, it 
examines patriotic trolling and its impact on undermining civil society credibility. 
Fourth, it discusses the political contexts that serve as preconditions for the pro-
liferation of cyber bullying. Fifth, it concludes with policy recommendations. This 
study is based on social media content analysis and personal conversations with 
bullied activists and journalists in Thailand. 
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Regime Background
Thailand’s incumbent military regime tactically combines cyber repression and so-
cial media manipulation. The political establishment (i.e. the “yellow shirts,” which 
comprises the palace, army, bureaucrats, allied business, and Bangkok middle 
class) and new political forces (i.e., the “red shirts,” which comprises pro-poor but 
potentially autocratic politicians, their rural constituents, and pro-democracy civic 
groups) have been involved in a decade-long political conflict offline and online. 
The red shirts have relied on online platforms to express their anti-establishment 
sentiments, which have alarmed traditional elites (Liu 2014). The elites responded 
with cyber repression which occurred in two waves. First, they drafted and passed 
the Computer Crime Act after the 2006 coup, which authorised state agencies to 
block Internet content deemed a threat to national security and public order. Neti-
zens were also encouraged to monitor transgressive comments online and report 
them to the authorities. Second, the army blocked and began to monitor several 
websites after it re-seized power subsequent to the yellow shirts’ disruptive protests 
in 2013–2014. At the same time, lèse majesté (insulting a monarch) charges against 
critics, dissidents, and ordinary citizens skyrocketed. In 2016 the regime amended 
the 2007 Computer Crime Act, which led to an increase in sentences for loosely 
defined cyber offences, the intensification of content censorship, and the consoli-
dation of state monitoring bodies (Sombatpoonsiri 2017). The junta has also been 
systematically recruiting patriotic Thais to report and punish those considered to 
be “disloyal” to the monarchy.
The Philippines has been an electoral democracy since 1986, but land-based 
elites have continued to capture political and economic powers, turning the country 
into an “oligarchic democracy” (Anderson 1988). These traditional elites tended to 
accommodate values such as good governance, political liberty, and human rights 
as long as questions of redistribution and land reform are marginalised (Thompson 
2016). Given the elites’ normative stance, any explicit government suppression of 
Internet freedom would have seemingly contradicted the liberal narrative. Thus, 
despite the implementation of the Cybercrime Prevention Act in 2012, the Phil-
ippines witnessed a near absence of Internet censorship (Freedom House 2017). 
However, the 2016 rise of president Duterte reflected popular disillusionment with 
the liberal status quo, which had been incapable of improving the livelihoods of the 
populace. Duterte’s tough talk, head-on dismissal of liberal norms, seeming subver-
sion of the US’s role as the Philippine’s imperial patron, and his hawkish approach 
to law and order indicate an illiberal turn (Plagemann and Ufen 2017) and have 
resonated with millions of constituents seeking change and strong leadership. Both 
Duterte’s media experts and many of his supporters actively engaged in social me-
dia campaigns that supported him not only during his candidacy but even after the 
election (Sinpeng 2016). Cyber troops have showered the president with unreserved 
compliments and attacked his critics, especially those who oppose his notorious 
anti-drug war, which has produced more than 10,000 extrajudicial killings of drug 
suspects. 
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Composition of Cyber Troops and Tactics
In Thailand and the Philippines security forces units, party machinery, and civic 
groups have manipulated online content and trolled critics. Common tactics range 
from surveillance and the report of legal breaches to the authorities, to online and 
offline bullying, to the use of fake accounts to generate public opinions. Thailand’s 
police force and the Ministry of Communication and Technology (now known as 
the Ministry of Digital Economy) developed the Cyber Scout Programme in 2010 to 
indoctrinate the younger generation in royalist values and to create a youth-based 
network of online surveillance of lèse majesté activities. Training workshops have 
been offered to high school and university students across Thailand. As of 2016, 
there were 112 schools committed to the programme. More than 120,000 students 
have been recruited as cyber scouts so far, with that number expected to double in 
the near future. Scouts are tasked with befriending suspects on Facebook, initiating 
conversations with them about sensitive issues, and then reporting any alleged lèse 
majesté violations to the authorities (Sombatpoonsiri 2018). 
Other groups are initiated by citizens (although aided by individual security 
elements) who seek to defend the monarchy from offline and online offences. Be-
tween 2010 and 2013, the Social Sanction group monitored lèse majesté postings 
on various social media platforms, especially Facebook, and typically exposed the 
personal profiles of transgressors on the Social Sanction Facebook and YouTube 
pages for public bullying. Targets sometimes faced serious consequences such as 
losing their jobs or being denied places at education institutions. The Rubbish Col-
lection Organisation (RCO) was founded in 2013 during the yellow shirt protests 
and sought to rid Thailand of “social rubbish” and to “eradicate lèse majesté of-
fenders completely” within two years. The RCO focuses on social media activities, 
and its Facebook page has attracted more than 300,000 likes. The RCO’s modus 
operandi consists of exposing lèse majesté infractions and notifying the police. If no 
legal action is taken, the group discloses an offender’s private address and encour-
ages mobs to harass them at home. In April 2014 the parents of an exiled offender 
were pressured into filing a case of lèse majesté against their own daughter (Som-
batpoonsiri 2018).
There are also similarly minded – though less visible – Facebook pages, such 
as the Network of Volunteer Citizens to Protect the Monarchy on Facebook and 
the Anti-Ignorance Association, which also monitor and report online lèse majesté 
cases to the police. The efforts have led to charges being pressed against red shirt 
activists. Since the 2014 coup, the number of royalist Facebook pages has multi-
plied. They usually share doctored images, which sometimes contain obscene and 
sexist captions that demonise dissidents. They also misquote activists’ interviews 
or speeches in order to highlight their political partisanship with red shirts and 
disloyalty towards the palace. Right-wing and anti-liberal online media, including 
the Thai-language T-News, Chaopraya News, and Deeps News and the English-
language The New Atlas, Alt Thai News Network (ATNN), and New Eastern Out-
look (NEO) tend to align their rhetoric with these cyber troops and the junta. 
In the Philippines pro-government cyber troops comprise party campaign-
ers, volunteers, and paid trolls. Duterte’s viral social media campaign trails set the 
stage for post-election cyber activism. Alongside Duterte’s aides – who are savvy 
in new media communication and political marketing – around 400–500 volun-
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teers, mostly from Duterte’s footholds and overseas worker communities, were re-
cruited for campaign trails. Dubbed “influencers” (trend setters on social media), 
these volunteers increased their presence by connecting with their own social media 
networks to amplify the messages. Some of their networks can draw up to 800,000 
members. “Hashtagging” and reposting were instrumental to popularising short 
and catchy presidential campaign messages. These volunteers tended to retaliate 
against those deemed disrespectful to Duterte with online bullying, such as issu-
ing threats of rape (against female critics) and physical assault. Duterte’s key cam-
paigner admitted that, at times, the reactions were out of control. This pattern of 
cyber activism continues today because it helps sustain the public perception that 
the government is widely supported (Gavilan 2016). 
Online content manipulation persists despite the government’s denial of its in-
volvement. Cyber trolling can be a lone wolf act or organised. Duterte has a strong 
support base, as his popularity among Filipinos remains high across class and 
demo graphic backgrounds. His supporters are ready to defend him against what 
they see as the liberal elites’ plot to overthrow him. Individuals’ social media post-
ings echo Duterte’s rhetoric, justifying the war on drugs, condemning human rights 
organisations, and denouncing government criticisms as “fake news.” They also 
accuse critics of being, inter alia, “shameless liberal organisations,” “presstitutes” 
(an insult for allegedly “sell-out” journalists), “criminal sympathisers,” and “im-
moral evil.” Groups such as Duterte’s Die Hard Supporters and the Overseas Fili-
pino Workers Global Movement carry out organised trolling both online and offline. 
They fact-check and falsify NGO reports that criticise the government. In May 2017, 
in New Zealand, a group of members physically disrupted an NGO panel discussing 
the human cost of the war on drugs (Stanfield 2017: 55–58). 
Approximately 300 to 500 “keyboard warriors” have reportedly been paid be-
tween PHP 1,000 (USD 19) and PHP 10,000 (USD 190) a month. They repost and 
circulate distorted news and online information about adversaries, pick fights on-
line and negatively label dissidents, and create fake social media accounts (i.e. bots) 
that circulate automated key campaign messages to influence public perception of 
what is true and untrue. These bots work in tandem with human trolls and genuine 
supporters to maintain the perceived popularity of Duterte and discredit the oppo-
sition (Ong and Cabanes 2018). 
Patriotic Trolling
An effective repression tactic is to exploit nationalist sentiment to mobilise pub-
lic antagonism of dissidents. Domestic advocacy groups that receive international 
funding or solidarity support are particularly vulnerable to this type of patriotic 
trolling. In Thailand efforts to bully internationally supported NGOs are less or-
ganised than that levelled at Thai and international journalists at the zenith of the 
2013 royalist-led protests and after the 2014 coup. With the international commu-
nity, particularly the US and the European Union, pressuring the junta to reinstall 
democracy, news stories framing the pressure as part of a CIA scheme for regime 
change started to pop up on the Internet. This narrative typically links pro-democ-
racy activists, academics, journalists (especially the online media Prachatai), and 
human rights organisations, with the red shirt political leadership, whom the US 
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government allegedly endorses. Thus, the international funding of their activism is 
depicted as an effort to topple the junta, restore a red shirt–led government, and 
reinforce Western hegemony in South East Asia. 
An English-language article propagating this theory initially appeared in the 
ATNN in mid-2014. Since 2015, the website has repeatedly published dozens of 
articles spreading the same plot and sources of evidence. Related news outlets such 
as New Atlas and NEO have shared these articles on their websites. Although not 
entirely false, the information was tweaked to reinforce the notion that the groups 
involved are Western instruments for regime change. In August 2016 The Nation – 
a mainstream, English-language newspaper – published the “Soros Leaks.” Citing 
the New Atlas article, it claimed that the Fund for Open Society and the National 
Endowment for Democracy had sponsored a number of dissidents in Thailand. In 
early 2018 this alleged scandal resurged on the prominent Thansetthakit news web-
site, reaffirming the narrative of Western intervention in Thailand’s domestic af-
fairs. Among the organisations now being attacked are the United Nations and the 
Heinrich Böll Foundation. The alleged scandal sparked debates on social media. 
Many social media influencers with tens thousands of followers actively reposted 
it and expressed their agreement with the story. In the comments section linked 
to the news article, Thai organisations receiving international support have been 
disparaged as “foreign lackeys,” “parasites,” and “traitors.” Some comments are ex-
tremely hostile, wishing the “wipe out” of the “families of these traitors.”  In 2017 
a columnist for Thairath, a national tabloid, proposed that the junta should enact 
a law that circumvents the international funding of NGOs – as happened in India, 
Russia, and Hungary. 
Links between state agencies and patriotic trolls in Thailand have been dif-
ficult to establish. But online attacks reinforce official rhetoric and Thai political 
culture, which tend to downplay grass-roots movements’ genuine efforts for democ-
ratisation. In the worst case, the cocktail of allegations of corrupt, anti-monarchy, 
and unpatriotic NGOs legitimates state repression of civic groups. For example, 
Prachatai saw it headquarters raided time and again, its web content sometimes 
banned, and its journalists charged. Since the alleged scandal, they have struggled 
to apply for domestic grants, which account for the large share of Prachatai’s an-
nual budget.
In the Philippines the narrative against international advocacy stems from the 
country’s colonial experience and is drawn upon by Duterte. His anti-drug cam-
paign is portrayed as a patriotic commitment to “cleaning up” the country, and his 
aggressive responses to international condemnation of alleged human rights viola-
tions symbolise his underdog struggle against the liberal elites backed by imperial 
power (Teehankee 2016). The offensive tone of online bullies mimics Duterte’s and 
his aides’ sexist and vulgar verbal attacks on critics, which include the United Na-
tions and the European Union. In 2017 he encouraged the police to shoot members 
of the human rights community if they were “obstructing justice.” One of his aides 
even accused  human rights groups of being used by drug lords (Pazzibugan 2018). 
Patriotic trolling of human rights groups revolves around discourses that some-
times portray critical journalists and human rights defenders as foreign collabora-
tors. Journalists for the anti-government news outlet Rappler, which has covered 
the war on drugs extensively, have received rape threats online, and the editor-in-
chief was asked to leave the country because of her unpatriotic behaviour. Some of 
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these comments were reportedly posted and shared by allegedly fake accounts that 
follow one another and tend to post the same content, which also appears on news 
sites such as Global Friends of Rody Duterte and Pinoy Viral News (Etter 2017). 
Such sites are designed to attract genuine Duterte supporters. Unorganised trolling 
on the Facebook pages of human rights groups (such as the Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch) also accuses these groups of being anti-Filipino and tar-
nishing the image of the Philippines internationally. An online columnist points 
to Western funding of rights groups as an effort to undermine the nation (Pedrosa 
2016). Patriotic trolls use this argument and the claim that rights activists protect 
criminals at the expense of victims to undermine rights-based arguments.
Even though there have been no cases of physical assault by cyber vigilantes 
or state suppression of Philippine rights activists, online comments suggesting that 
they deserve be “slaughtered,” “raped,” or “shot dead” generates fear among them 
(Stanfield 2017: 57). In the absence of state violence against civil society, cyber troops 
can hinder human rights advocacy through issuing threats at the grass-roots level.
Social Divide and Cyber Trolling
Online bullies are instrumentalised by both the state and government supporters to 
silence dissent. The former reflects the autocratic backlash against civil society; the 
latter, a deeper crisis of social polarisation. The cases of Thailand and the Philip-
pine reveal the interwoven relationship between these two aspects: autocratic and 
illiberal regimes can exploit existing social divides to consolidate power. 
Thailand’s political struggle was fought between those wishing to preserve 
the traditional political order and those aspiring to change it. In cyber space con-
stituents of the two sides tend to insult one another. For instance, the Anti-Social 
Sanction group emerged to counter the Social Sanction group by similarly expos-
ing group members’ personal data for online bullies. A number of red shirt web-
sites have also reportedly engaged in generating “misinformation.” Nonetheless, 
in Thailand the traditional polit ical order and its supporters have the upper hand: 
it permeates the state structure, security establishment, and bureaucracy, which 
guarantees the surveillance and state-sanctioned punishment of challengers. The 
junta’s use of cyber repression and manipulation has shed light on this pattern. 
Meanwhile, political discourses popularising the dominant order influence the pub-
lic to legitimate and defend it when questioned.  Citizens’ cyber bullying of dissi-
dents labelled as “un-Thai” epitomises this. The effects of this state–society nexus 
on shrinking civic space are twofold. First, the junta can rely on patriotic citizens to 
monitor others, report dissidents, and impose popular compliance with its political 
order. Second, this conduct breeds mistrust and exacerbates existing polarisation, 
thus hindering effective mass mobil isation to contest the incumbent regime.
The Philippines shows signs of social bifurcation. Duterte secured a landslide 
electoral victory because his rhetoric symbolised a diversion from the post-1986 
pol itical order. A general perception is that this order has perpetuated the domina-
tion of land-based liberal elites, who had failed to deliver policies that improved 
the livelihoods of Filipinos. Nonetheless, there remains a liberal segment of society 
which struggles to understand how their fellow citizens elected Duterte. Expressing 
their frustration on social media, they often refer to Duterte supporters as “Du-
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tertards” (derogatory shorthand for “Duterte retards”). In response, Duterte sup-
porters refer to them as “Yellowtards” (yellow being the colour associated with the 
past government). “Yellow armies” reportedly troll on social media to tarnish the 
president’s image domestically and internationally. Despite this, Duterte has man-
aged to hold on to power due to the continuing endorsement of the middle class 
and the poor and his co-optation of the security forces. In this power equation pro-
government trolls have the advantage of aligning themselves with the government 
apparatus to fan propaganda and discredit civil society critics. As evidenced by the 
ongoing lawsuits against Rappler, the government may choose to crack down on 
critical media while tolerating regime-supportive online bullies. The impact cyber 
trolling in the Philippine has on damaging the social fabric is similar to that in Thai-
land. It also reflects an emerging global trend: the shrinking of civic space occurs 
not only in autocracies but also in illiberal democracies where governments employ 
cyber manipulation to camouflage repression. 
Overcoming Social Divide and Engaging with Society
The growing role of cyber trolling in the global trend of shrinking civic space has 
not attracted sufficient international attention. In cases where it has, the focus has 
normally been on how cyber trolling constitutes a new autocratic tactic to silence 
dissent. The question as to the fragmentation of civil society tends to be missing. 
State apparatuses may sanction cyber bullying, but segments of civil society whose 
political aspirations are in line with the ruling power may willingly defend the re-
gime by cyber trolling its critics. Internationally supported civic actors disparaged 
as traitors have become a target of passionate masses whose verbal and physical 
threats against them are justified as a patriotic duty. The nature of social media as 
an echo chamber potentially intensifies hate campaigns against critics. Defaming 
messages get likes, are shared, and are responded to by those who do not question 
the biases underpinning the messages. Although opposition trolling also transpires, 
pro-government trolling is officially welcome and even sanctioned by the ruling 
power, which reaps the benefit of social divide. 
European development agencies, political foundations, and EU policymakers 
should tackle this worrying trend in two ways. First, they should take steps to en-
hance local ownership of human rights and democracy advocacy. The rhetoric that 
civil society promotes “Western” interests partly originates in domestic civic groups’ 
failure to vernacularise concepts such as human rights and democracy. Rather than 
merely financing activism or applying pressure on the regime, international actors 
should engage with local activists to reinterpret national histories, norms, and re-
ligious beliefs. This reframing strategy can situate norms perceived as foreign in 
a local context so as to invalidate government accusations that advocates of these 
norms are traitors. In addition, European agencies can play a role in encouraging 
the building of alliances among regional activists. Alliances function as solidarity 
networks that facilitate independent fundraising (e.g. crowdfunding) and campaign 
lobbying. This would help generate a perception that progressive activism is home-
grown and “non-Western.”
Second, it is essential to address social divides that serve as fertile ground for 
cyber trolling. One option is to create online spaces for dialogue across political 
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camps. Increased support should be offered to activists who create online platforms 
for constructive discussions aimed at bridging the perception gaps between con-
stituents of different political camps. These platforms can counterbalance online 
sites or social media pages designed to generate hatred and worsen social divides. 
Other initiatives might include recruiting volunteers to document and publicise the 
pattern of cyber trolling and introducing campaigns for media literacy. Social media 
users should be informed to take caution when coming across hateful comments or 
baseless allegations that are constitutive of organised trolling. Collective advocacy 
for diversifying sources of online information can also mitigate the echo chamber 
effect of social media. While international actors have a crucial role in these pro-
posals for “cyber dialogue,” this role should be limited to encouraging, facilitating, 
and building capacity for local actors. Social divides that enable government crack-
downs on civil society can only be tackled if domestic civic groups take the lead.
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